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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Arthur Richmond appeals from his judgment of conviction upon a
jury's verdict that he is guilty of aggravated assault.

Richmond asserts the

district court erred in failing to properly instruct the jury regarding self-defense,
and erred in denying his motion for a new trial based on the court's failure to give
the jury a unanimity instruction.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
The state charged Richmond with aggravated assault against his thenfiance Michelle Williams.

(R., pp. 20-21; Tr., p. 156, Ls. 11-14.

1)

Richmond

committed the assault while driving his car, with Williams in the passenger seat.
(Tr., p. 158, Ls. 14-21.)
The two got into an argument while driving from Garden City to Meridian.
(Tr., p. 164, Ls. 2-7.)

Richmond screamed and cussed and called Williams

names, then punched Williams in the side of the head with enough force that her
head hit the windshield. (Tr., p. 159, Ls. 14-16; p. 160, Ls. 12-18.) Richmond
continued to punch Williams in the eyes, nose, mouth, chest, arms, legs, and

1

The appellate record includes two transcripts, paginated separately. One
includes most of the trial proceedings, Richmond's hearing on motion for new
trial, and sentencing; that transcript will be referenced herein as "Tr." The
second transcript, described on the cover page as "Volume 1" includes the trial
proceedings from jury instruction conference through the verdict and Richmond's
guilty plea to the persistent violator charge; that transcript will be referenced
herein as "Tr., Vol. 1."
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hands when she put her hands up to defend herself. (Tr., p. 160, L. 20 - p. 161,
Ls. 18.) Through this, Williams "was in and out of consciousness." (Tr., p. 161,

L. 1.)

At some point, Richmond took Williams' seatbelt with his hand "and

started choking [her] with it." (Tr., p. 162, L. 19 - p. 163, L. 5.) Richmond later
told police that "[h}e grabbed her by the throat with ... the old up-and-under
move." (Tr., p. 150, Ls. 7-8.)
After they arrived at Richmond's mother's house, Williams went to a
neighbor's house and the neighbor drove Williams to a bar where her friends
were. (Tr., p. 164, Ls. 8-1 0; p. 165, Ls. 13-24.) Williams had a shot of whiskey
and a beer, then went to two other bars where friends bought her other drinks.
(Tr., p. 166, Ls. 9-23.) Williams testified that she is an alcoholic, and that she
drinks when things are bad to numb the pain. (Tr., p. 168, L. 17 - p. 169, L. 1.)
A bartender who saw Williams testified she "was crying. She had blood on her
clothes. Her nose was bleeding. She was bruised and swollen." (Tr., p. 215,
Ls. 15-17.) The bartender asked Williams "what happened, and pretty much
called 911 right after that." (Tr., p. 215, L. 21 - p. 216, L. 4.)
Williams recalled talking to police about the assault. (Tr., p. 169, Ls. 1725.) A corporal dispatched to the scene testified Williams was "[e]xtreme [sic]
swollen on her face, both eyes swollen, starting to turn black and blue, nose was
bleeding heavily, blood on her clothing ... marks on her throat going around to
her neck." (Tr., p. 131, L. 24 - p. 132, L. 24; p. 133, L. 25 - p. 134, L. 4; State's
Exhibits 1-7.) The corporal described injuries to Williams' jaw, throat, and chest
as "all consistent with strangulation marks."
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(Tr., p. 137, Ls. 11-16.)

The

corporal further testified, "typical strangulation marks are finger width. These are
very, very wide.

A lot of force.

There is even some scratching and some

burning-type looking marks consistent with rug burns." (Tr., p. 137, Ls. 19-24.)
When paramedics arrived, Williams told them what happened to cause
her injuries, but refused to go to the hospital. (Tr., p. 191, Ls. 14-24; p. 203, Ls.
24-25.)

A paramedic testified that Williams "had lots of swelling around both

eyes, swollen nose, [and] swollen lip with bleeding," consistent with more than
one punch, and an indication of a possible fracture below the right eye. (Tr., p.
205, Ls. 2-25.)
After interviewing Williams, the corporal contacted Richmond in Meridian,
and observed he had "[b]lood on his hands and blood on his clothing'" and a
"black-and-blue mark [in the] area of [his] right eye." (Tr., p. 142, Ls. 14-22; p.
143, Ls. 2-3; p. 144, Ls. 18-19.) Also, Richmond had "swelling on [his] right
hand[;] knuckles, fingers, clearly bigger than [his left] hand." (Tr., p. 146, Ls. 2-6;
State's Exhibits 9-16.)
Another officer photographed the inside of Richmond's car. (Tr., p. 227,

L. 5 - p. 228, L. 9; State's Exhibits 17-32.) That officer described "a bunch of
blood ... on the front passenger's seat," the backrest, and center console, as
well as the back passenger's seat. (Tr., p. 230, L. 4 - p. 232, L. 15.) The officer
also testified there was blood on the front passenger seatbelt, "up towards the where the right shoulder would be," and on the driver's seat headrest. (Tr., p.
233, Ls. 8-11; p. 234, Ls. 2-11.)

3

Richmond testified that he and Williams were "having an animated
conversation" during the drive to Meridian, and he tried to soothe her when she
got upset describing a bad dream. (Tr., p. 272, Ls. 1-3; p. 275, L. 9 - p. 276, L.
4; p. 276, L. 23 - p. 277, L. 17.) According to Richmond, they stopped at a
friend's home to get some marijuana, but the friend was not home. (Tr., p. 278,

L. 22 - p. 279, L. 3.) Richmond testified that, as he drove away from the friend's
house, Williams suddenly punched him in the side of the head. (Tr., p. 280, Ls.
20-24.) When asked if he knew why she hit him, Richmond testified, "That I do
not know," then added, "But prior to that she insisted that I ... [g]o back to our
friend's house ... and try again" to get some marijuana, but he had "told her no."
(Tr., p. 280, L. 25 - p. 281, L. 8.) Richmond claims Williams then punched him a
second time, straight in the face. (Tr., p. 281, Ls. 16-20.)
According to Richmond, he pulled over and told her to get out of the truck.
(Tr., p. 282, L. 2 - p. 283, L. 21.) When she refused, Richmond testified, he
said, "Are you going to behave, because ... [t]his is not going to work for us ....
What's gotten into you today? ... I need you to hold it together until we get
home." (Tr., p. 283, L. 25 - p. 284, L. 15.) Richmond testified that Williams
agreed, and he began driving again. (Tr., p. 284, Ls. 10-15; p. 285, Ls. 9-11.)
Richmond testified he asked Williams how she was doing, but she said nothing,
then a moment later, she "reached out and grabbed me by my shirt sleeve and
pulled me forward and started pummeling me ... hitting me on the side of the
head and the face." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 11-20.) Richmond testified that he put his
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hand up "to block her from hitting [him], [and] [s]he caught me with a real good
one, and I pulled the wheel over." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 20-23.)
Richmond described that Williams kept hitting him as they headed toward
oncoming traffic, and "there was nothing else that I could do, so I started to fight
back." (Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-15.) Richmond testified he "was trying to get [Williams}
off of [him]" and then he felt he "connected a really good shot . . . I made
contact." (Tr., p. 288, Ls. 5-20.) After that solid hit, he swung again and "felt
another solid contact that had hit." (Tr., p. 288, Ls. 20-21.) Richmond testified
that Williams "was still pushing toward [him]" so he did "that up-and-under move"
which involved grabbing her sweatshirt and pushing her back into her seat. (Tr.,
p. 289, Ls. 2-10.)

Richmond testified he somehow continued to drive to his

mother's house, with he and Williams "still hanging onto one another." (Tr., p.
289, L. 12 - p. 290, L. 21.)
According to Richmond, after arriving at his mother's, they went to the
back porch and talked for 10-15 minutes.

(Tr., p. 291, L. 16 - p. 292, L. 4.)

Richmond testified he told Williams, "I love you, Sugar, but what was that all
about? ... I don't understand your rationale of what you were doing .... This is
not good for us at all." (Tr., p. 292, Ls. 8-16.)
The jury found Richmond guilty of aggravated assault (R., p. 108), and
Richmond pleaded guilty to the persistent violator charge. (Tr., Vol. I, p. 94, L. 8
- p. 97, L. 3).
trial.

Before sentencing, Richmond moved for acquittal or for a new

(R., pp. 112-16.)

The district court heard oral argument and issued a

Memorandum Decision and Order denying Richmond's motion. (R., pp. 126-32.)

5

The district court entered a judgment of conviction, sentencing Richmond to a
unified term of nine years in prison, with two years fixed. (R., pp. 137-40.) On
Richmond's petition for post-conviction relief, the district court entered an order
vacating and reentering judgment to afford Richmond the opportunity to appeal.
(R., p. 150.) Richmond timely appealed. (R., pp. 152-55.)
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ISSUES
Richmond states the issues on appeal as:
1.

Did the district court commit fundamental error by misdirecting the
jury on self-defense?

2.

Did the district court err by denying Mr. Richmond's motion for a
new trial because the court should have given a unanimity
instruction?

(Appellant's brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.

Has Richmond failed to establish that the district court's jury instruction
regarding self-defense amounted to fundamental error because he cannot
show an error of constitutional magnitude that affected the outcome of his
trial?

2.

Has Richmond failed to show error in the denial of his motion for a new
trial because he cannot show error, let alone fundamental error, in the trial
court's failure to give an unrequested special unanimity instruction?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Richmond Has Failed To Establish The District Court's Jury Instruction
Regarding Self-Defense Amounted To Fundamental Error

Introduction

A.

Richmond asserts the trial court erred in instructing the jury that an
assault is justifiable as self-defense if defendant believed he was in "imminent
danger of death or great bodily harm," rather than "danger only of bodily injury."
(Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Although he did not object at trial, Richmond argues the
instruction amounted to fundamental error. (Appellant's brief, p. 8.) Richmond's
argument fails because, under applicable case law, the error was not of
constitutional magnitude, and given the record, the error did not affect the
outcome of proceedings.

B.

Standard Of Review
Generally, issues must be raised before the trial court to be considered on

appeal.

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 224, 245 P.3d 961, 976 (2010).

An

exception applies for unobjected-to error depriving a criminal defendant of due
process.

lg.; State v. Jockumsen, 148 Idaho 817,820,229 P.3d 1179, 1182

(2010). To establish such fundamental error, an appellant must demonstrate: (1)
violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the error is clear and
obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that the error affected
the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. This
three-prong test applies where the unobjected-to error concerns jury instructions,
as here. State v. Calver,_ P.3d _, 2013 WL 2396726 at *5 (Ct. App. 2013).
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"Whether jury instructions fairly and adequately present the issues and
state the applicable law is a question of law over which [the appellate] Court
exercises free review." State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587-88, 261 P.3d 853,
864-65 (2011) (citation omitted).

For its review, the Court looks "at the jury

instructions as a whole, not individually, to determine whether the jury was

kl

properly and adequately instructed."

at 588, 261 P.3d at 865 (citation

omitted).

C.

Applying United States Supreme Court And Idaho Supreme Court Case
Law, There Was No Constitutional Violation In The Trial Court's
Instruction Regarding Self-Defense
The disputed jury instruction - No. 20 - set forth five conditions, all of

which "must be found to have been in existence at the time of the assault" in
order to find that defendant "acted in self-defense."

(R., p. 95.)

conditions included:
1. The defendant must have believed that the defendant was in
imminent danger of death or great bodily harm.
2. In addition to that belief, the defendant must have believed that
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the
defendant from the danger presented.
3. The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that
the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily
injury and believed that the action taken was necessary.
4. The defendant must have acted only in response to that danger
and not for some other motivation.
5. When there is no longer any reasonable appearance of danger,
the right of self-defense ends.
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Those

(R., p. 95; Tr., Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 20 - p. 38, L. 18.) Instruction 20 used the model
instruction, I.C.J. I. 1517, regarding self-defense or defense of another for either
homicide or battery. I.C.J.I. 1517. However, the instruction uses the language
"death or great bodily harm" and "death or great bodily injury," appropriate where
the charge is homicide, rather than "bodily harm" and "bodily injury," appropriate
where the charge is battery, or in this case, aggravated assault. (R., p. 95.)
The Idaho Supreme Court found it was error for a trial court to instruct the
jury on self-defense using the language "death or great bodily injury" where the
charged offense was aggravated assault rather than homicide.

State v.

Woodward, 58 Idaho 385, _, 74 P.2d 92, 96-97 (1937) (discussing Deshazo v.
State, 118 Tex.Cr.R. 42, 37 S.W.2d 751, 752 (1931 )); see also State v. Hansen,
133 Idaho 323, 329, 986 P.2d 346, 352 (Ct. App. 1999). Thus it was error for the
district court in this case to use "great bodily injury" or harm rather than only
"bodily injury" or harm in Instruction 20.

But to satisfy the first prong of the

fundamental error test, Richmond must show the trial court's error affects a
constitutional right. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. He cannot meet
this burden.
Due Process demands that a jury find "beyond a reasonable doubt ...
every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." Martin v.
Ohio, 480 U.S. 228, 231-32 (1987) (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)).

"[T]he State must prove every element of the offense, and a jury

instruction violates due process if it fails to give effect to that requirement." State
v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 588, 261 P.3d 853, 865 (2011) (citation omitted);
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Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 437 (2004).

However, the state has no

constitutional burden to disprove an affirmative defense.

Martin, 480 U.S. at

232. A requirement that the state "assume[ ] the burden of disproving affirmative
defenses" is a matter of state law; states that place the burden on defendants to
prove an affirmative defense are not "in violation of the Constitution."

kl

(citing

Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 211 (1977)).
Richmond does not assert the trial court erred in its instructions regarding
the elements of aggravated assault. (See R., pp. 88, 91.) It is undisputed that
the jury found, beyond a reasonable doubt, those facts for which the state had
the burden of proof under the Constitution. The trial court properly instructed the
jury, per Idaho law, 2 that the state had the burden of disproving Richmond's
theory of self-defense. (R., p. 96.) Although the trial court erred in instructing
the jury about the conditions required for self-defense, such error did not impact
the state's constitutional burden of proof, and was therefore not fundamental
error.
Holding that fundamental errors in jury instructions were subject to
appellate review, the Court commented, "Rule 30(b) would still forbid review of
any error not so egregious that it produced manifest injustice by violating the
defendant's due process rights under the federal or Idaho constitutions." State v.
Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007).

Under Rule 30(b),

"No party may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless

2

I.C. § 19-2112, which had placed the burden on defendant to prove selfdefense, was repealed by S. L. 1977, ch. 154, § 6.
11

the party objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating
distinctly the instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the
objection." I.C.R. 30(b). Commenting that its holding did not "reduce[] Criminal
Rule 30(b) to a nullity," the Anderson Court reasoned, "Presumably, since most
jury instruction errors do not double as manifestly unjust due process violations,
Idaho Criminal Rule 30(b) would apply in most cases in which no timely objection
followed a trial court's error." Anderson, 144 Idaho at 749, 170 P.3d at 892. As
contemplated in Anderson, Rule 30(b) applies here, to preclude Richmond's
challenge. Because Richmond failed to object at trial, appellate review is limited
to constitutional errors. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P .3d at 978. Under Martin,
the error here was not of constitutional magnitude, therefore Richmond's
argument fails.
D.

The Trial Court's Error Was Harmless
Even if this Court were to disagree with Martin, and find the trial court's

error was of constitutional import, Richmond cannot satisfy the third prong of
Perry, that the error affected the outcome of proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at
226, 245 P.3d at 978. In Perry, the Court addressed constitutional errors in jury
instructions.

kl

at 222-24, 245 P.3d at 974-76. Where a constitutional error

"affect[s] the entire deliberative process," then the "jury's deliberations [are]
fundamentally flawed," and automatic reversal is warranted.

kl

at 223-24, 245

P.3d at 975-76 (discussing Neder v. U.S., 527 U.S. 1 (1999); Sullivan v.
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Louisiana, 508 U.S. 275 (1993)).

Where instead, "jury instructions were only

partially erroneous, such as where the jury instructions improperly omitted one
element of a charged offense, the appellate court may apply the harmless error
test."

kl

As already discussed, the jury instructions here did not omit or err as

to any element of the charged offense, but used overly restrictive language for
the conditions required to establish self-defense. (R., p. 95.) See Woodward, 58
Idaho at_, 74 P.2d at 96-97. If the Court finds, despite Martin, that Richmond's
constitutional rights were affected, the impact was at most partial, rather than to
"the entire deliberative process."
Applying the harmless error analysis, Richmond cannot show that the
instructional error affected the outcome of proceedings. Notwithstanding the two
instances of erroneous wording, Instruction 20 follows the language of I.C.J.I.
1517, which is presumptively correct. McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 571 n.2,
225 P.3d 700, 704 n.2 (2010) (citation omitted). The third condition in Instruction
20 provides, "The circumstances must have been such that a reasonable
person, under similar circumstances, would have believed that the defendant

was in imminent danger .

. and believed that the action taken was necessary."

(R., p. 95 (emphasis added) (ellipses used in place of erroneous wording); Tr.,

Vol. 1, p. 37, L. 20 - p. 38, L. 18.) This reasonable person standard "is designed
to prevent excessive force under the circumstances [by] the person claiming selfdefense." State v. Scroggins, 91 Idaho 847, 849, 433 P.2d 117, 119 (1967).
Together, the conditions set forth in Instruction 20 and I.C.J.I. 1517 reflect the
requirement in Idaho law that "the quantum of force that may be used in self-
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defense is dependent upon the nature of the attack upon the defendant." See
Hansen, 133 Idaho at 352, 986 P.2d at 352.
As part of Instruction 20, the jury was informed it must find all conditions
for self-defense satisfied in order to find Richmond's assault was justified. (R. p.
95.) Thus, Instruction 20 informed the jury that the state had to convince the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that one or more of the listed conditions was not
satisfied, to show that Richmond's assault was not justifiable. The record amply
supports that the state met this state-law burden at trial.
The second condition provided, "the defendant must have believed that
the action the defendant took was necessary to save the defendant from the
danger presented." (R., p. 95.) The fifth condition provided, "When there is no
longer any reasonable appearance of danger, the right of self-defense ends."
(R., p. 95.) These conditions included no erroneous language, nor reference to

the erroneous language. The record demonstrates that these conditions were
not satisfied.
Richmond testified that he patiently tried to calm and soothe Williams,
who got upset describing a nightmare as he drove them from Garden City to
Meridian. (Tr., p. 271, Ls. 9-10; p. 272, Ls. 1-16; p. 275, L 9 - p. 277, L. 17.)
According to Richmond, Williams inexplicably punched him in the face after an
unsuccessful effort to buy marijuana from a friend who was not home. (Tr., p.
278, L. 22 - p. 279, L. 3; p. 280, Ls. 20-24.) Richmond testified that Williams
punched him a second time, "right square in the face," then he pulled the car
over to the side of the road.

(Tr., p. 281, L. 16 - p. 283, L. 9.)
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Richmond

testified he told her to get out of the car, or "hold it together until [they] got
home," because her behavior was "not going to work for us." (Tr., p. 283, L. 19 p. 284, L. 9.)

Richmond claimed Williams told him he "needed to pay closer

attention, that I'm not giving her the love and support that I should be giving her
right at this particular moment." (Tr., p. 285, Ls. 9-18.) According to Richmond,
Williams then grabbed him again and "she started pummeling me ... hitting me
on the side of the head and face, and I was putting my hand up to block her from
hitting me." (Tr., p. 286, Ls. 16-21.)
Richmond testified they "were directly in oncoming traffic" and she "was
right on top of me. She kept hitting me, and there was nothing else that I could
do at that particular point, so I started to fight back." (Tr., p. 287, Ls. 3-15.)
According to Richmond, he connected two solid contacts, hitting back at
Williams. (Tr., p. 287, L. 17 - p. 288, L. 21.) He felt Williams "stop what she
was doing," but because she was still pushing up against him, he did an "up-andunder move," which involved grabbing her sweatshirt and pushing her into her
seat. (Tr., p. 288, L. 22 - p. 289, L. 10.)
His testimony stands in stark contrast to Williams' account.

Williams

testified Richmond began the drive angry with her, and that he screamed and
cussed at her.

(Tr., p. 158, L. 24 - p. 159, L. 16.)

Williams testified that

Richmond began punching her, hitting her eyes, nose, mouth, arms, legs, chest,
and hands, and that she was "in and out of consciousness." (Tr., p. 160, L. 12 p. 161, L. 18.) Richmond also choked Williams with her seatbelt. (Tr., p. 162, L.
19-p. 163, L. 5.)
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Testimony by police who investigated the incident, the paramedic who
arrived to treat her, and the bartender who called 911, described a heavily
bleeding and swollen Williams. (Tr., p. 133, L. 25- p. 134, L. 4; p. 205, Ls. 2-25;
p. 215, Ls. 15-17.) Police also testified Williams had strangulation marks, wider
than finger-width, and consistent with "[a) lot of force." (Tr., p. 137, Ls. 19-24.)
Police described Richmond as having "[b]lood on his hands and blood on his
clothing," a "black-and-blue mark [in the] area of the right eye," and swelling on
his right hand's knuckles and fingers. (Tr., p. 143, Ls. 2-4; p. 144, Ls. 18-9; p.
146, Ls. 3-6.) Another officer testified the car where the assault occurred had "a

bunch of blood ... on the front passenger's seat," the backrest, and center
console, as well as the back passenger's seat. (Tr., p. 230, L. 4 - p. 232, L. 15.)
The evidence fails to support the inference that beating Williams bloody
and strangling her with her seatbelt was reasonable self-defense.

Even if

restraining her by choking her with a seatbelt were easier than pulling over, the
evidence fails to demonstrate that the force used to batter and choke Williams
was limited to that necessary to save Richmond from either battery or a driving
hazard.

(See R., p. 95).

Williams' injuries, as described by four different

witnesses at trial support use of force far exceeding the two punches Richmond
admitted to.

The paramedic testified, "the area of the injury, the different

locations of the injury[,] it would be hard to accomplish with one strike." (Tr., p.
205, Ls. 16-18.) The record demonstrates that Richmond's physical attack on

Williams far exceeded what was needed to defend himself given the alleged
danger presented.
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Further, Richmond acknowledged doing the "up-and-under move" after
Williams stopped fighting, but was "still pushing up against me." (Tr., p. 288, L.
22 - p. 289, L. 11.) According to Richmond, he kept Williams in her seat this
way, and managed to continue driving the rest of the way to his mother's house.
(Tr., p. 290, L. 2 - p. 291, L. 16.) This appears to be Richmond's explanation for
the strangulation marks on Williams' neck, which police described as "very wide,"
involving a "lot of force," and "consistent with rug burns, peeling skin ... extreme
discoloration all the way from her jawline ... down to the bottom of her throat."
(Tr., p. 137, L. 19 - p. 138, L. 3.) The record does not support a reasonable
appearance of danger justifying the force used in Richmond's "up-and-under"
strangulation move, causing Williams' injuries as described by police.

If

Richmond was able to continue driving to his mother's house, he was able to pull
the car over and come to a stop; Richmond did not need to strangle Williams.
The record supports that one or more of the conditions in Instruction 20
that were unaffected by the erroneous language was not satisfied. Accordingly,
the evidence demonstrated that Richmond's attack and consequent threat of
violence against Williams was not justifiable, regardless of the erroneous
language in the affected conditions. In other words, the erroneous language did
not contribute to the jury's verdict. The trial court's error was therefore harmless.
Richmond has failed to establish the third prong required for fundamental error,
thus his argument should be rejected.
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11.
Richmond Has Failed To Show The District Court Erred In Denying His Motion
For A New Trial
A.

Introduction
Richmond argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a new

trial based on the trial court's failure to give a unanimity instruction. (Appellant's
brief, pp. 13-18.) Because Richmond did not object to the lack of a unanimity
instruction, he must show fundamental error such that a new trial was warranted.
Richmond has failed to establish the elements required for fundamental error.

B.

Standard Of Review
The appellate court "exercises free review over whether a jury was given

proper instructions." State v. Severson, 147 Idaho 694, 710, 215 P.3d 414, 430
(2009).

C.

Richmond Cannot Show Error, Let Alone Fundamental Error, In The Trial
Court's Failure To Give An Unrequested Special Unanimity Instruction
Richmond did not object to the jury instructions at trial, let alone request a

special unanimity instruction. (Tr., Vol. 1, p. 31, Ls. 6-10.) Instead, he raised the
issue in a motion for a new trial, which the district court denied, on determination
that a unanimity instruction was not needed. (R., pp. 112-16, 127-32.) On its
review of the district court's order denying the motion, this Court freely reviews
whether the lack of a unanimity instruction was in accordance with state law.
Draper, 151 Idaho at 587-88, 261 P.3d at 864-65.
The general rule that "Idaho's appellate courts will not consider error not
preserved for appeal through an objection at trial ... serves to induce the timely
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raising of claims and objections, which gives the [trial] court the opportunity to
consider and resolve them." Perry, 150 Idaho at 224, 245 P.3d at 976 (citations
omitted). "In the case of an actual or invited procedural error, the [trial] court can
often correct or avoid the mistake so that it cannot possibly affect the ultimate
outcome."

~

(citing Puckett v. U.S., 129 S.Ct. 1423, 1428 (2009)). Thus, "when

an error has not been properly preserved for appeal through objection at trial, the
appellate court's authority to remedy that error is strictly circumscribed to cases
where the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal."

~

(citation

omitted). This fundamental error rule applies here. Because Richmond did not
object at trial, he must satisfy the fundamental error test established in Perry.
As already discussed, to establish such fundamental error, an appellant
must demonstrate: ( 1) violation of an unwaived constitutional right; (2) that the
error is clear and obvious without need to further develop the record; and (3) that
the error affected the outcome of the proceedings. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245
P.3d at 978. Because Richmond was not entitled to a unanimity instruction, he
has failed to show error in the failure to give such an instruction, much less
fundamental error entitling him to reversal of his conviction.
The jury here was instructed that its verdict must be unanimous. (Tr., p.
44, Ls. 1-2.) The Idaho Supreme Court has held that "[a]n instruction that the
jury must unanimously agree on the facts giving rise to the offense . . . is
generally not required." State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 474, 272 P.3d 417,
446 (2012) (emphasis added) (quoting Severson, 147 Idaho at 711,215 P.3d at
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431). The exception to this general rule is when a defendant commits different
criminal acts, each of which constitute "separate incidents involving distinct
unions of mens rea and actus reas."

lsL

at 475, 272 P.3d at 447. Where each

of multiple acts "would independently support a conviction for the crime
charged," the jury must be instructed "that it must unanimously agree on the
specific occurrence giving rise to the offense." Severson, 147 Idaho at 711, 215
P.3d at 431.
Where the evidence supports "separate, distinct, and independent
crime[s], rather than [one] continuing course of conduct without end," the courts
will conclude there were multiple offenses, and a special unanimity instruction is
warranted.
2000).

Miller v. State, 135 Idaho 261, 267, 16 P.3d 937, 943 (Ct. App.

"A specific unanimity instruction is required only where it appears that

there is a genuine possibility of jury confusion or that a conviction may occur as
the result of different jurors concluding that the defendant committed different
acts." State v. Gain, 140 Idaho 170, 172, 90 P.3d 920, 922 (Ct. App. 2004).
In this case, the state charged Richmond with a single criminal act aggravated assault.

The Information charged Richmond with attempting "to

commit a violent injury upon the person of Michelle Williams, by a means and/or
force likely to produce great bodily harm, to-wit: by punching her in the head
and/or face causing severe swelling and bruising to her eyes and face, and
bleeding to her nose and/or by grabbing her by the neck and applying pressure."
(R., pp. 24-25.)

Richmond asserts there was evidence of two separate and

distinct criminal acts of aggravated assault upon which the state was relying in
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order to prove that charge - namely, "punching and strangling."

(Appellant's

brief, pp. 16-18.) But punching and strangling are acts of battery - "willful and
unlawful use of force or violence upon the person of another." I.C. § 18-903(a).
An assault is an "unlawful attempt ... with apparent ability, to commit a
violent injury to the person of another." I.C. § 18-901(a). Assault also includes
"an intentional and unlawful threat by word or act to do violence to the person of
another, coupled with an apparent ability to do so, and doing some act which
creates a well-founded fear ... that such violence is imminent." I.C. § 18-901 (b).
An aggravated assault, charged here, includes an assault "by any means or
force likely to produce great bodily harm." I.C. § 18-905(b). In other words, an
aggravated assault is the threat of violence, creating a well-founded fear of such
imminent violence, by means likely to produce great bodily harm.
The evidence demonstrates that Richmond was appropriately charged
with a single count of aggravated assault, based on his threatening behavior,
which included punching and strangling. (R., pp. 24-25.) The entire assault took
place in Richmond's car on a drive from Garden City to Meridian. (Tr., p. 164,
Ls. 2-7.)

Testimony from both Williams and Richmond shows that, once

Richmond's threatening behavior began, it was uninterrupted.

Richmond's

punching and strangling of Williams would not each independently support a
conviction for aggravated assault. See Severson, 147 Idaho at 711,215 P.3d at
431. Richmond's assault on Williams, in Richmond's car during one drive, was
one continuous threat of great bodily harm, based on multiple physical acts of
violence. See Miller, 135 Idaho at 267, 16 P.3d at 943. Accordingly, Richmond
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was not entitled to a special unanimity instruction.

Richmond has therefore

failed to show error, let alone fundamental error, and his argument should be
rejected.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
judgment of conviction and order denying Richmond's motion for a new trial.
DATED this 4th day of March, 2014.
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